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Abstract
We use a simple non-parametric regression approach to measure the re-
lationship between employment growth, hirings and separations in a large
panel of German establishments over the period 1993–2014. Although it is
often claimed that firms in Europe have less flexibility in their ability to
hire and fire, we find that the relationship between employment growth and
worker flows in German establishments is very similar to the behaviour of
US establishments. The relationship is stable over time, even during the
2008-09 economic crisis, and across different types of establishment. We
verify our results with independent measures from administrative data. We
suggest that this result is due to: the strong relationship between employ-
ment reductions and voluntary separations; the low level of “churning”; and
the heterogeneity of jobs within establishments.
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1 Introduction
It is often claimed that a key difference between labour markets in the United
States and those in continental European countries is the ease with which employ-
ers can adjust their workforce. For example, Pries and Rogerson (2005) argue that
worker turnover in Europe is much lower than in the United States, even though
job turnover is similar, and this can be partly explained by policy and institu-
tional differences such as the minimum wage and dismissal costs. On the worker
side, these differences manifest themselves in lower unemployment entry rates but
longer unemployment durations in Europe. On the firm side, which this paper fo-
cuses on, these differences manifest themselves in lower variability of employment
and differences in hiring and separation behaviour for a given rate of employment
adjustment.
The increasing availability of detailed firm- and establishment-level data, linked
to records of workers’ employment spells, has allowed researchers to examine how
firms’ hirings and separations vary with changes in employment. For the United
States, Burgess, Lane and Stevens (2001, p.11) find that falls in employment are
achieved by increasing separations rather than reducing hiring. This is confirmed
by Davis, Faberman and Haltiwanger (2006, p.17) who show that, in shrinking
establishments, separations increase approximately one-for-one with job loss. In
stark contrast, Abowd, Corbel and Kramarz (1999) show that, in France, job loss
in establishments is associated with a reduction in hiring rather than an increase
in separations. Abowd and Kramarz (2003, p.500) argue that French firms rely
on the hiring margin because of differences in employment institutions and associ-
ated adjustment costs compared to the US. Furthermore, those French institutions
which cause firms to rely on the hiring margin “may be more typical of European
institutions” more generally.
The German labour market is generally regarded as having one of the highest
levels of protection against worker dismissal. The OECD’s employment protection
index (OECD, 2013) classifies Germany as having some of the strongest Employ-
ment Protection Legislation (EPL) in the OECD. The OECD EPL index ranks
Germany 4th out of 34 for protection of workers against individual dismissal, and
6th for additional provisions for collective dismissals. On both these measures,
dismissal is characterised as more difficult in Germany than in France. However,
regulations on temporary employment are considerably less restrictive in Germany
than in France. German establishments face numerous restrictions on their ability
to dismiss workers, as documented by the OECD.1 These include notification pro-
1Taken from the OECD EPL database update 2013, available from
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cedures, the length of notice period, severance pay, social criteria which determine
who can be laid off, the definition of unfair dismissal, compensation following un-
fair dismissal, and additional delays and negotiation for collective dismissals. Some
of these restrictions are reduced for establishments employment 10 or fewer em-
ployees, although a study by Bauer et al. (2007) finds no effect of this discontinuity
on worker flow rates.
Our paper provides three contributions to this debate. First, we provide new
evidence on the relationship between hires, separations and job flow rates using
data from a large panel of German establishments over the period 1993–2014. We
use a simple non-parametric regression to estimate the share of employment falls
which is accounted for by (a) reductions in hiring and (b) increases in separa-
tions. We show that, despite the very different labour market institutions, the
relationship between employment changes and worker flows in German establish-
ments is very similar to the behaviour of establishments in the United States.
German establishments do in fact increase separations strongly when they reduce
employment.
Second, we show that this finding is robust to the type of data used to mea-
sure worker and job flow rates. by comparing our survey data with administrative
social security data. Although worker flow rates are substantially higher in the
administrative data, the relationship between worker flows and job flows is very
similar. In addition, we have a rich set of measured characteristics of the estab-
lishments in our sample, and we also show that the relationship is quite stable
across establishment characteristics.
Our third contribution is to show that this phenomenon is related to three
features of the data. First, there is a strong relationship between employment
reductions and voluntary separations (quits). Second, the low level of churning
(excess job flows) means that a reduction in hiring is not sufficient to accommodate
falls in employment. Third, we show that establishments comprise heterogeneous
jobs, so that employment reductions cannot be accommodated by moving those
workers whose jobs are lost to positions made vacant by workers who leave.
Our results imply that cross-country differences in the worker flows may not
be due to differences in hiring and separation responses to a given amount of
employment growth, but rather to shifts in the employment growth distribution
itself. This is consistent with the cross-country evidence from Bassanini (2010),
who shows that the cross-country variation in worker flows is well-explained by
the variation in job flows.
http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/Germany.pdf. More detail on German EPL can be found
in Bauer, Bender and Bonin (2007) and Jahn (2009).
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2 Basic concepts and theoretical background
Following Davis et al. (2006), the employment change of firm i, between t− 1 and
t, is given by the difference in hires Hit and separations Sit over that period:
∆Nit = Hit − Sit. (1)
Separations can be broken down into quits (employee-initiated separations) and
layoffs (employer-initiated separations). As has been established in the empirical
literature, gross worker flows are much larger than job flows because workers may
join and leave a given set of jobs, or because, within firms, the composition of jobs
may change.
The key feature of (1) we explore in this paper is that a given employment
adjustment may be achieved either through hiring or separations. Abowd and
Kramarz (2003) argue that the high costs of firing workers in France mean that
falls in employment (up to a certain point) are accommodated by reductions in
hires. In the US, with much lower firing costs, falls in employment lead immediately
to increases in layoffs.
The standard matching model by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) does not
involve employment adjustment costs (no hiring and firing costs), does not explic-
itly consider quits, since they are assumed to be exogenous (on-the-job search is
ruled out), and does not consider multi-worker firms. A newly created job is syn-
onymous with a hire, and a destroyed job is synonymous with a separation. Davis,
Faberman and Haltiwanger (2012) refer to this as an “iron-link” between job flows
and worker flows. However, since employment growth represents a key feature of
the empirical analysis in this paper, the standard framework should be extended
to allow for multi-worker firms as in Cooper, Haltiwanger and Willis (2007). The
basic prediction of the Cooper et al. model is that a firm, which faces a constant
quit rate q¯, can achieve a fall in employment of up to q¯ without increasing sepa-
rations. This is preferable because separations involve some cost (e.g. severance
pay). However, employment falls larger than q¯ can only be achieved by increasing
layoffs one-for-one with job losses. Thus, the extent to which firms can rely on a
reduction in hires to accommodate falls in employment depends on the extent to
which firms have worker turnover in excess of job turnover, labelled as “churning”
by Burgess et al. (2001).
Davis et al. (2012) discuss various ways in which one might relax the assumption
of an exogenous quit rate. First, the quit rate may vary with aggregate conditions.
In a slack labour market q¯ is lower, so separations increase for smaller falls in
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employment. Second, the quit rate may vary with conditions within the firm.
Faberman and Nagypa´l (2008) show that quit rates are constant in expanding
establishments and increase rapidly in firms which are shrinking. This occurs if
the relative value of outside options for workers increases when conditions within
the firm worsen. Third, models of matching as an experience good (where workers
and firms learn about each other’s qualities after matching) suggest that the quit
and separation rate may actually increase with firm growth because firms which
hire more workers at t− 1 will have more mismatched workers at t.
We refer to the use of q¯ to achieve employment reductions as the “attrition
channel”. As noted, the scope of the attrition channel to achieve employment
reductions depends on the extent of churning. In turn, this depends on the size of
hiring and firing costs, including those imposed through employment protection
legislation (EPL). However, the relationship between EPL and the use of separa-
tions is likely to be complex. If EPL reduces churning, then it also reduces the
scope for firms to use the attrition channel. On the other hand, if EPL makes
layoffs costly, it increases the incentive to use the attrition channel.
Finally, although the theories described above assume multi-worker firms, they
still assume homogeneous workers. This means that a quit reduces employment but
has no other consequences for production. Thus, quits and layoffs are equivalent
methods of achieving employment reduction. However, if workers are imperfect
substitutes, then quits may have to be replaced even if employment is falling. This
implies that separations will increase even for small falls in employment, because
firms cannot rely on attrition.
3 Existing empirical evidence
There are a large number of studies which document the behaviour of job cre-
ation and job destruction, or gross job flows, across establishments; Davis and
Haltiwanger (1999) provide a literature review. Although some authors have
claimed that job flows are relatively similar across countries (see for example Pries
and Rogerson, 2005), the more consistent cross-country comparisons of Bassanini
(2010) shows that both worker and job flows vary across countries, and that vari-
ations in worker flows are well explained by variations in job flows.
Fewer papers consider the relationship between job turnover and worker turnover.
Abowd et al. (1999) use a linked employer-employee panel of about 1,700 French
establishments with at least 50 employees for the period 1987–1990. They show
that, for these establishments, the creation of one job corresponds to three hires
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and two separations. In contrast, the destruction of one job entails one hiring
and two separations. Abowd and Kramarz (2003) argue that the reason for this
pattern is the structure of adjustment costs in France. In particular, separation
costs are high for workers on permanent contracts, which gives firms an incentive
to adjust on the hiring margin. Firms also have an incentive to use fixed-term
contracts which do not incur such high separation costs.
For the United States, Burgess et al. (2001) use quarterly data from Maryland
and show that, in contrast to Abowd et al. (1999), employment falls are associated
more strongly with increases in separations than with reductions in hires. These
findings are confirmed by Davis et al. (2006), who show that there is a very strong,
almost one-for-one relationship between separations and job loss in contracting
establishments. Davis et al. also show that the relationship between employment
change and worker turnover is very stable over the business cycle. This suggests
that the driving force behind increases in layoff rates in a recession is a shift in
the cross-sectional distribution of establishment-level employment growth.
These results are consistent with the idea that firms which face stricter EPL
must use reductions in hiring (the attrition channel) to achieve falls in employment.
Evidence from other European countries, however, does not support the idea that
the use of the attrition channel varies systematically with EPL. Results for both
Denmark (Albæk and Sørensen, 1998) and Portugal (Centeno, Machado and Novo,
2009) show that only a small fraction of the fall in employment is accounted for
by a reduction in hires. Denmark and Portugal have very different OECD EPL
indices, but the relationship between job and worker flows from those countries
are similar.
Other papers which examine the relationship between employment change and
worker flows using German data are Bauer and Bender (2004), Bauer et al. (2007),
Alda, Allaart and Bellmann (2005) and Bachmann, Bayer, Seth and Wellschmied
(2013). Bauer and Bender (2004) use the same data as we do in this paper (see Sec-
tion 4), but only for the period 1995–1996. They examine the relationship between
organisational changes, job flows and worker flows. Bauer et al. (2007) examine
the effect of changes in worker dismissal legislation on Germany job and worker
flow rates in small establishments. Alda et al. (2005) compare “churning rates”
(the excess of worker turnover over job turnover) between German and Dutch
establishments, and find that German establishments have much lower churning
rates. They suggest that this is because of the lower share of fixed term contracts
in Germany and the greater use of apprenticeships and works councils in Germany.
Bachmann et al. (2013) use German social security data to examine the cyclical
pattern of worker and job flows. They also show that in the cross-section the
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relationship between worker and job flows is very similar to that in the US.
4 Data and measurement
The Institut fu¨r Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB) Establishment Panel is
an annual survey of between c.4,000 and c.10,000 establishments located in West
Germany (since 1993) and between 4,000 and 6,000 located in East Germany
(since 1996). The sampling frame comprises all establishments in Germany with
at least one worker subject to social security as of 30 June in the year before the
survey. The survey currently covers approximately 1% of all plants in Germany and
approximately 7% of workers because it is weighted towards larger plants. Weights
to ensure that the sample is representative are calculated by comparing the sample
of establishments with the population of establishments in the same Federal state,
size and industry cell. The population of plants is obtained from a Federal Agency
for Employment establishment database. Information is obtained by personal
interviews with plant managers, and comprises about 80 questions per year, giving
us information on, for example, total employment and total employment 12 months
earlier, total sales, investment, wage bill, location, and industry. A more detailed
description of the data and the weighting procedure is described in Fischer, Janik,
Mu¨ller and Schmucker (2009).
The IAB panel provides a measure of the number of workers who were recruited
and who left the establishment in the first six months of each calendar year. Es-
tablishments are also asked for the cause of the separation. Appendix A gives a
precise description of the relevant questions.
It is standard to calculate employment growth, hiring and separation rates by
dividing by average employment between t and t− 1:
hit =
Hit
0.5(Nit + N˜i,t−1)
(2)
sit =
Sit
0.5(Nit + N˜i,t−1)
(3)
It follows that ∆nit = hit − sit. We follow Faberman (2008) in using N˜i,t−1 =
Nit − Hit + Sit as a revised measure of lagged employment to ensure adding up.
Because the survey records hires and separations over a six-month period, N˜i,t−1
is estimated employment six months before t, and the rates in (2) and (3) are
six-monthly rates.
We use the longest run of data available to us at the time of writing, from 1993
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to 2014. This enables us to compare the behaviour of German establishments over
several business cycles. In total, 62,436 establishments (317,497 establishment-
years) appear in the survey. We restrict the sample to those establishments in
the private sector.2 This exclusion reduces the sample to 49,802 establishments
(215,165 establishment-years).
We remove a small number of observations which have missing values for hires,
separations or employment (1,414 observations). We then check the consistency of
information on hires, separations and employment. We remove observations where
the number of separations is greater than reported employment at t− 1 (343 ob-
servations). In theory it is possible that separations are greater than reported
employment at t − 1 if establishments have extremely high within-year turnover,
but we regard this as unlikely in practice. Our robustness checks using adminis-
trative data (reported later on) suggest that within-year hires and separations are
relatively unimportant. We also check the difference between the 12 month change
in employment and the six-month change in employment implied by the difference
between hires and separations over that period. This difference is an estimate of
net hires for the last six months of t − 1. This difference is typically very small,
with a median of zero, and 98% of the observations lying in the range (−91, 71).
We exclude observations where the difference is in the top and bottom 0.1% of
the distribution (426 observations). Finally, we check whether the reported recall
value of employment for 30th June t− 1 is consistent with the reported value for
30th June t from the previous wave of the data. These values are also very consis-
tent, with 98% of the sample lying in the range (−2, 3). Again, we remove the top
and bottom 0.1% (318 observations). This leaves a final clean sample of 49,464
establishments and 212,677 establishment-years.
Only a minority of establishments are followed for the entire sample period,
either because of genuine establishment entry and exit, or because of sample entry
and exit. The number of establishments surveyed increases substantially over time,
partly as a result of the introduction of establishments in East Germany in 1996.
The average size of establishment also changes over the sample period. In our
analysis we therefore focus on within-establishment changes which control for any
changes in sample composition. Table B1 in Appendix B shows that the average
size of establishments in the sample fell after the introduction of East German
establishments in 1996, and has continued to fall since then. Despite the large
2Establishments are excluded if they are in sectors defined as “non-industrial organisations and
public administration”, if they reported being a public corporation or other non-profit making
legal form, or if they reported being publicly owned. Selection is made on the basis of the first
recorded value for each of these criteria, to ensure maximum continuity of establishments in the
sample.
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change in average employment, the worker turnover rate is relatively stable. The
distribution of employment growth rates across all establishments in our sample
is shown in Figure B1.
In this paper we ignore establishment entry and exit. This is because our
measures of worker turnover refer to hires and separations made over the first six
months of each calendar year. An establishment which disappears between 30th
June t and 30th June t+ 1 does not record these measures at t+ 1 by definition.
In addition, entry is complicated by the fact that an establishment which appears
for the first time in the Betriebspanel on 30th June t must have existed on 30th
June t− 1 to be included in the sampling frame. In fact, establishment entry and
exit accounts for a small fraction of job and worker flows because entry and exit is
concentrated in small establishments. Calculations from the social security data
show that less than 2% of employment is in establishments which enter or exit in
a particular year.
Table 1 summarises annualised job and worker turnover rates across different
establishments, and can be compared with Davis et al. (2006, Table 2). Because of
the large changes in the sample composition over time, we use sampling weights.
In addition, we weight to the population of workers (as do Davis et al., 2012),
in order to account for the fact that large establishments have greater effects on
aggregate measures such as the hiring and separation rate. Gross job turnover (the
sum of job creation and destruction) is highest in construction and other service
industries, and lowest in manufacturing. Job creation and to a lesser extent job
destruction decline with initial establishment size.
The IAB Establishment Panel allows us to distinguish between separations
which are initiated by the establishment, and those which are initiated by the
worker. We label separations as employer initiated if the respondent classified
them as “Dismissal on the part of the employer”, “Leaving after termination of
in-company training” or “Expiration of a temporary employment contract”. All
other separations are classified as quits (see Appendix A for a list of all separation
categories). The final four columns of Table 1 reports the estimated quit and
layoff rates. The final column of Table 1 provides the first evidence that layoff
behaviour in German establishments is not very different from the behaviour of
U.S. establishments. The ratio of layoffs to destroyed jobs is actually slightly higher
in Germany, although the pattern across industries is similar, with construction
and services having higher layoff rates.
The measures of hires and separations recorded in the establishment panel
are potentially subject to measurement and recall error which may bias down the
measured hiring and separation rates, particularly for short-term appointments.
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For example, Anderson and Meyer (1994, p.184) note that a firm-level survey
of hires and separations conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics undercounts
worker turnover. In addition, the establishment panel records hires and separations
only for the first six months of each calendar year, and may therefore be affected
by seasonal patterns of recruitment and separation. Therefore we also use the
social security employment statistics register of the German Federal Agency for
Employment to check the robustness of our findings. The Bescha¨ftigtenstatis-
tik covers all workers or apprentices registered by the social insurance system.
Information on workers includes an establishment identification number.3
The social security data can be used in two ways to construct measures of
hires and separations. The first, which we call the point-in-time measure, selects
all workers in the social security register who were employed by the establishments
in the IAB survey at a point in time t in each year. Hires and separations can then
be calculated by observing changes in establishment identifiers at the worker level
between t−1 and t. The employment statistics register tracks establishments over
time whether or not they are in the IAB establishment panel in that year. There-
fore an establishment which joins or leaves the panel will not cause an erroneous
jump in hires or separations for that year. The point-in-time measure excludes
within-period hires and separations. That is, a worker who joins an establishment
after t− 1, and leaves that establishment before t will be excluded.4
The second measure, which we call the cumulative measure, uses data on all
spells of employment in a subsample of plants which appear in the IAB survey in
every year from 1996 to 2005.5 These data allow us to compute the cumulative
number of hires and separations during the interval between t− 1 and t. In prin-
ciple, the cumulative measure corresponds most closely to the reported measure
from the survey data, which is also a cumulative measure.
The bottom panel of Table 1 reports, for comparison, estimates of job and
worker turnover which use the social security point-in-time and cumulative mea-
sures. We also report estimates from the establishment survey for exactly the
same sample to ensure comparability. The hiring and separation rates estimated
from the establishment survey (12.6% and 10.3%) are lower than those estimated
from the social security point-in-time measure (14.4% and 15.7%). The fact that
3A detailed description of the employment data can be found in Bender, Haas and Klose
(2000).
4The calculation of hires and separations from the social security register requires a number
of sampling choices to be made. We show in Section C that although these choices affect the
total amount of worker churning, they do not greatly affect the relationship between job and
worker flows.
5These data are the “LIAB longitudinal model 3”, provided by the Research Data Centre
(FDZ) of the IAB.
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the discrepancy is larger for separations may be because the establishment survey
measure covers only the first six months of each year. Using the entire universe
of establishments in the social security data leads to an even higher estimate of
worker flows (18.3% and 15.4%), suggesting that, even after weighting, the sample
of establishments in the survey underestimates job and worker flows.
The cumulative measure of flows is available for a small subset of establish-
ments which appear in the establishment survey every year from 1996–2005. These
establishments tend to have lower rates of job and worker turnover because they
are larger and more stable. The final two rows of Table 1 compares job and worker
turnover rates from the establishment survey and the cumulative measure. The
hiring and separation rates from the establishment survey are slightly lower than
the corresponding estimates from the spell measure, again suggesting that there is
some under-reporting of hires and separations in the recall survey data. However,
we will show in the next section that this does not materially affect our main
conclusion on the relationship between job and worker flows.
5 The relationship between job and worker flows
To examine the relationship between job flows and worker flows, we follow Davis
et al. (2012) and divide the employment growth rate ∆n into a series of g =
1, . . . , G intervals, with mass-point at zero (constant employment). Intervals are
narrower nearer zero to reflect greater density of observations, and we use G = 60
bins in total. We then regress the worker flow rate of each employer on a vector
of dummy variables for the growth rate intervals. That is, we estimate
hit = α
h
i +
G∑
g=1
βhgD
g
it + γ
h
t + 
h
it (4)
sit = α
s
i +
G∑
g=1
βsgD
g
it + γ
s
t + 
s
it, (5)
where Dgit = 1 if ∆nit ∈ g and zero otherwise. It is not necessary to estimate
both models because ∆n = h − s, but it is convenient to refer to βh as the
estimated hiring response and βs as the estimated separation response. The models
include establishment (αi) and year (γt) fixed effects, so estimates of β
h and βs are
identified only by within-establishment changes in employment. Figure 1 plots the
resulting estimates of βh and βs, the within-establishment relationship between
employment growth (net job flows) and hiring and separation rates.
Two key points stand out from Figure 1. First, the degree of churning in
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Figure 1: 6-month employment growth, hiring and separations. IAB establishment
panel 1993–2009, controlling for establishment and time fixed effects. Vertical bars indi-
cate 95% confidence intervals, calculated using standard errors clustered at the establish-
ment level. The range of employment growth shown accounts for 96% of establishments
and 99% of employment in the sample.
establishments which have no employment change is much lower than estimated
for the United States (Davis et al., 2006) or France (Abowd et al., 1999). This
partly reflects the fact that we are observing flows over a six-month rather than
a 12-month period, but even accounting for this it appears that worker flows are
lower in Germany in plants which experience no change in employment. Second,
the relationship between employment changes and worker flows is very similar to
that reported by Davis et al. (2006) for the United States, but quite different
to those reported by Abowd et al. (1999) for France. There is a sharp increase
in separations even for small falls in employment. In contrast to the theoretical
prediction, the attrition channel (a reduction in hiring) is not the main mechanism
by which establishments shrink.
One possible explanation for the difference between our findings and those
for France is that we are using six-monthly recall data from a survey, rather than
changes in establishment identifiers between two years. We would naturally expect
lower churning rates in data recorded between two points closer together, and we
might also suspect that recall bias might have an effect. In Figure 2 we therefore
compare the relationship between job and worker turnover from the survey and
administrative data.
As expected, Figure 2 shows that there is more churning (hires and separations
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(a) Hiring, survey vs. point-in-time annual mea-
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(c) Hiring, survey vs. cumulative measure
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
-0.40 -0.30 -0.20 -0.10 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40
Establishment employment growth rate
Estab. Panel Survey
Social security spell measure
(d) Separations, survey vs. cumulative measure
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Figure 2: Employment growth, hiring and separations from the IAB establishment
panel and comparable social security data, controlling for establishment and time fixed
effects. Panels (a) and (b) use annualised data, panels (c) and (d) use data from the
first six months of each year.
14
in excess of employment growth) when measured from both types of social security
data (point in time and cumulative), but the key feature remains: separations
increase quickly in in response to employment falls. There is some evidence in
Panel (a) of Figure 2 of hiring reductions, but the separation response is much
larger. In short, both the survey data and the social security data suggest that
the relationship between worker turnover and employment growth is similar in
German and U.S. establishments.
To quantify the extent to which changes in hires contributes to changes in
employment, it is convenient to estimate a piecewise linear-spline variant of (4)
hit = α
h
i +
G∑
g=1
δhg (∆nitD
g
it) + γ
h
t + 
h
it (6)
In this specification, δhg is the proportion of the employment change accounted for
by a change in hiring within employment growth bin g. This model is similar to
that used by Albæk and Sørensen (1998), except that it uses a more flexible linear
spline rather than imposing a quadratic relationship. This is more appropriate
because the theoretical prediction is that there will be a “kink” in the hiring
reduction at the point where employment falls exceed q¯. If establishments reduced
employment entirely along the hiring margin rather than the separation margin,
then we would find δh = 1 for falls in employment which are smaller than q¯ (the
quit rate). Because δhg is estimated separately for each employment growth bin g,
the model allows for the contribution of the hiring margin to vary in an unrestricted
way.
We stress that equation (6) is only descriptive; it does not attempt to identify
the causal relationship between job-turnover and worker-turnover. For example,
in the model of Faberman (2008) a firm may find it optimal to continue an existing
job match, but may nevertheless choose not to replace a worker who quits because
of the cost of recruitment. Firms may also temporarily shrink if it takes time to
find replacement hires. Thus, some firms may contract as a result of worker quits.
Instead, this model allows us to examine and test in a parsimonious way whether
the margin of employment adjustment varies systematically between different types
of establishment and different time periods.
In Figure 3 we plot estimates of δhg from (6) from our full sample of establish-
ments. Panel (a) shows that for small falls in employment (0 > ∆n > −0.01)
almost 40% of the reduction is accounted for by a reduction in hires. Larger falls
in employment (for example −0.04 > ∆n > −0.05) require a larger increase in
separations and so the contribution of hiring reduction is smaller. For positive
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employment changes, in contrast, almost the entire increase is accounted for by
increases in hires, indicating that establishments which grow do not reduce sep-
arations, but rely almost entirely on the hiring margin. What is striking about
Figure 3 is that, even for very small falls in employment, the role of hiring reduc-
tions is considerably less than 0.5 and falls quickly. As was clear from Figure 1,
separations increase sharply when employment falls, and hence the contribution
of hiring reductions is limited.
(a) Employment reductions
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Figure 3: Estimates of δhg from Equation (6). δ
h
g measures the proportion of employ-
ment change in bin g accounted for by changes in hiring. Vertical bars indicate 95%
confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the establishment level.
How robust is this finding? In Table 2 we report our estimates of Equation (6)
for the full sample of establishments, and test whether the basic finding holds
under different assumptions and different sources of data. Our focus is on small
falls in employment, so for brevity in Table 2 we report estimates of δhg for those
values of g where 0 > ∆n ≥ −0.2.
Row (1) reports our baseline estimate from the establishment survey. For
employment falls of less than 5%, reductions in hiring account for 22% of the fall, so
the remaining 78% is accounted for by an increase in separations. The proportion
of the employment change accounted for by hiring reductions naturally falls for
larger employment reductions, since it becomes more difficult for establishments
to accommodate these falls without increasing separations.
In row (2) we use the cross-section weights which ensure that the distribution
of employment in the establishment survey is representative of the distribution of
employment in the population as a whole. As noted in Section 4, the survey is
heavily weighted towards large establishments. If the separation response δh varies
across establishment size, then weighting will make a difference. In fact, row (2)
shows that weighting makes little difference to our results.
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Table 2: Estimates from Equation (6) with establishment and year fixed-effects. For
example, δh−0.05 is the estimated proportion of employment reduction accounted for by
a reduction in hiring for 0 > ∆n ≥ −0.05. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
at the establishment level. Job flows and worker flows are measured over the first six
months of each calendar year, with the exception of the point-in-time annual measures
reported in rows (3), (4) and (6).
δh−0.05 δ
h
−0.1 δ
h
−0.15 δ
h
−0.2 N R
2
(1) IAB establishment survey (6-month) 0.207 0.116 0.100 0.069 212, 673 0.742
(0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
(2) Weighted by sampling weights 0.199 0.110 0.084 0.078 210, 778 0.723
(0.027) (0.016) (0.015) (0.012)
(3) Social security annual point-in- 0.334 0.273 0.230 0.191 113, 716 0.616
time measure (0.025) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009)
(4) Social security annual measure 0.389 0.312 0.270 0.230 90, 759 0.663
all workers, 1999 onwards (0.034) (0.017) (0.013) (0.012)
(5) Social security cumulative measure 0.290 0.152 0.059 0.049 14, 316 0.699
(0.042) (0.026) (0.023) (0.034)
(6) Social security annual point-in- 0.282 0.235 0.194 0.160 25871214 0.612
time measure (population) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
(7) Excluding establishments with 0.173 0.102 0.082 0.055 157, 656 0.764
vacancies at t (0.014) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008)
(8) Relationship over two years 0.224 0.178 0.118 0.092 157, 963 0.670
(0.021) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
In row (3) we estimate the same model using the social security point-in-time
data (for those establishments which match to the survey data). Figure 2 showed
that there was substantially more churning in the social security data, and also
that hires appear to fall slightly more when establishments shrink. The result
is that the estimated contribution of hiring to employment reductions is larger
(δh−0.05 = 0.336), but hires still contribute significantly less than half of the total
fall in employment.
In Appendix C we describe various issues in the calculation of worker flows
from the social security data. In particular, we note that from 1999 onwards the
social security data include records for more marginal workers (for example, those
with temporary contracts). The inclusion of these workers in measures of worker
flows increases the churning rate, and as a result might be expected to increase the
contribution of hiring reductions to employment falls. The idea is that an estab-
lishment with temporary workers which wishes to reduce employment can simply
not renew contracts. Row (4) shows that the inclusion of all workers from 1999 on-
wards does increase the estimate of δhg , but does not alter our conclusion that the
majority of employment reductions are accomplished by increasing separations,
not reducing hires.
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In row (5) we use the cumulative measure from spell-based social security data.
This makes little difference to the estimated contribution of hiring reductions.
Using the entire population of establishments in row (6) also results in a similar
estimate.
A potential concern is that the strong relationship between separations and
small employment reductions is the result of reverse causality. Perhaps, in the
short-run, establishments which lose workers via quits also shrink because it takes
time to find a suitable replacement. We can investigate this possibility because
the survey asks whether establishments have any unfilled vacancies. To eliminate
the possibility that short-term fluctuations in employment are driven by quits,
in row (7) we report estimates based on a sample of establishment which report
having no vacancies. Arguably, establishments which reduce employment and
which have no vacancies cannot have reduced in size because of quits. Excluding
establishments with vacancies actually reduces the estimates of δhg . In other words,
the relationship between separations and employment reductions is stronger in
these establishments.
Another similar check is provided in row (8). If short-term fluctuations in
employment are caused by worker quits, then the relationship between separations
and employment reductions should be less strong over a two-year interval. This
does not seem to be the case, since the estimated hiring response is still small.
Overall, estimates of δhg are quite stable across all these different samples. In
every case, the contribution of hiring reductions to even small employment falls
is considerably less than one-half, confirming that German establishments which
shrink do indeed increase separations, despite the institutional constraints they
face.
We now consider whether the hiring and separation response varies systemati-
cally across different types of establishment in terms of their industry, size, location
and in relation to the business cycle. The top panel of Table 3 estimates (6) sep-
arately by industry. Since industries differ greatly in their technology and skill
requirements, we might expect to observe different responses to changing labour
demand. In fact, although the estimates of δh−0.05 do vary significantly across in-
dustries (p-value=0.010), in no case does the estimated hiring response exceed
one-third of the total employment fall. The hiring response is largest, and hence
the separation response smallest in Transport and Communication, Manufacturing
and Other Services. There appears to be even less difference in the hiring response
for larger falls in employment. Thus, although industries vary significantly in
terms of their average worker turnover rates (see Table 1), this does not seem to
be caused by a different response to a given change in employment.
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Table 3: Estimates of Equations (6) separately by industry, establishment size, location
and time periods. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the establishment level.
Job flows and worker flows are measured over the first six months of each calendar year.
δh−0.05 δ
h
−0.1 δ
h
−0.15 δ
h
−0.2 N R
2
Primary industries 0.160 0.093 0.090 0.078 8,645 0.806
(Agriculture, mining) (0.076) (0.055) (0.050) (0.041)
Manufacturing 0.237 0.123 0.086 0.072 67,932 0.746
(0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
Construction 0.068 0.113 0.086 0.041 23,676 0.789
(0.052) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021)
Wholesale and retail trade 0.167 0.126 0.107 0.061 37,837 0.697
(0.024) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Transport and communication 0.262 0.146 0.145 0.173 9,452 0.762
(0.059) (0.040) (0.032) (0.036)
Financial and business services 0.148 0.066 0.096 0.053 31,475 0.704
(0.049) (0.028) (0.025) (0.022)
Other services 0.266 0.112 0.128 0.087 33,656 0.735
(0.053) (0.033) (0.020) (0.020)
p-value H0: Adjustment equal [0.002] [0.442] [0.330] [0.055]
0–10 employees 0.085 0.088 0.095 0.063 86,039 0.741
(0.158) (0.025) (0.013) (0.011)
11–20 employees 0.245 0.095 0.095 0.060 26,489 0.753
(0.048) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016)
21–30 employees 0.128 0.129 0.091 0.053 18,604 0.795
(0.030) (0.020) (0.022) (0.027)
31–50 employees 0.181 0.138 0.105 0.071 18,000 0.764
(0.036) (0.019) (0.021) (0.029)
51–100 employees 0.158 0.082 0.116 0.091 19,496 0.742
(0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029)
> 100 employees 0.233 0.133 0.104 0.097 44,045 0.676
(0.017) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018)
p-value H0: Adjustment equal [0.011] [0.102] [0.944] [0.494]
Western Germany 0.220 0.128 0.106 0.079 129,181 0.713
(0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Eastern Germany 0.178 0.093 0.090 0.055 83,492 0.770
(0.022) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011)
p-value H0: Adjustment equal [0.094] [0.035] [0.275] [0.123]
1993–1995 0.399 0.217 0.139 0.090 8,959 0.698
(0.044) (0.032) (0.024) (0.037)
1996–1999 0.292 0.136 0.138 0.082 25,606 0.744
(0.037) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
2000–2002 0.182 0.175 0.148 0.094 33,380 0.726
(0.041) (0.023) (0.021) (0.016)
2003–2006 0.177 0.092 0.086 0.029 47,542 0.781
(0.025) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018)
2007–2010 0.200 0.082 0.100 0.098 48,458 0.739
(0.029) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017)
2011–2014 0.196 0.117 0.124 0.066 48,728 0.716
(0.029) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
p-value H0: Adjustment equal [0.000] [0.000] [0.415] [0.070]
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In the second panel of Table 3 we compare the adjustment path between estab-
lishments of different sizes.6 The highest estimates of δh−0.05 are for the two small-
est establishment size categories, although note that there are few observations in
these categories and these estimates are rather imprecise. For establishments with
more than 20 employees δh−0.05 increases with establishment size, although there is
no significant difference in the hiring response for larger falls in employment. But,
even for the largest size category the hiring response is still only one-quarter of
the total employment fall.
In the third panel of Table 3 we compare δhg between establishments located in
West and East Germany.7 Establishments in West Germany have a significantly
higher hiring response and therefore a smaller separation response, but the size of
the difference is quantitatively small. This finding is consistent with the fact that
the separation and layoff rate is higher in East Germany (see Table 1).
The final panel of Table 3 compares the adjustment path across the business
cycle, using sub-periods based on the aggregate unemployment rate.8 If the quit
rate is pro-cyclical, then firms which need to reduce employment in a boom will
be able to shrink more easily without making layoffs and we would expect δhg to
be pro-cyclical. However, although δh−0.05 does vary across the periods (p-value
< 0.000), there is little evidence that it does so in a way which is systematically
related to the business cycle.
Overall, our results clearly indicate that German establishments rely heavily
on the separation margin when they reduce employment. The majority of any
employment reduction is accommodated by increased separations, and this result
is robust across establishment industry, location, size and time.
6 Why do German establishments use separa-
tions?
The key finding in this paper is that German establishments’ separation rates
increase strongly when they shrink. We have shown that this result is quite robust
across data sources and types of establishment. In this section we provide three
pieces of evidence which help to explain this phenomenon.
6We use establishments’ initial size to avoid a contemporaneous relationship between size
categories and changes in employment.
7Establishments in West Berlin are included in the East German sample for consistency over
time.
8Periods 1996–1999 and 2003–2006 had higher than average aggregate unemployment.
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6.1 Quits and layoffs
One possible explanation is that establishments allow quits rather than layoffs to
accommodate falls in employment. As noted in Section 2, some theoretical models
predict that quit rates will increase rapidly in firms which reduce employment.
In Figure 4 we plot the relationship between employment change and separations
split between voluntary and involuntary separations, as defined in Section 4 (see
Appendix A for a list of all separation categories).
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Figure 4: Relationship between layoffs, quits and job flows. We label separations
as employer initiated if the respondent classified them as “Dismissal on the part of
the employer”, “Leaving after termination of in-company training” or “Expiration of
a temporary employment contract”. All other separations are classified as quits (see
Appendix A for a list of all separation categories).
The relationship between layoffs and ∆n is stronger than the relationship be-
tween quits and ∆n only for large (> 30%) falls in employment. For establishments
with employment growth, quits are a larger proportion of total separations than
layoffs. These patterns are similar to those observed by Davis et al. (2006, Figure
7), although in the US the point at which layoffs exceed quits occurs for smaller
falls in employment. To quantify these effects more precisely, we estimate (6) but
with separations as the dependent variable:
sit = α
s
i +
G∑
g=1
δsg(∆nitD
g
it) + γ
s
t + 
s
it. (7)
The coefficients δsg tell us the proportion of the employment fall accounted for
by separations. δsg will be negative because separations increase when ∆nit is
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negative. The first row of Table 4 reports estimates from (7) for all separations,
so this replicates the base model with δsg = δ
h
g −1. From Table 2 we know that the
hiring response to a fall in employment of less than 0.05 is 0.207, so the separation
response must be 0.793.
Table 4: Estimates of Equations (7) with different definitions of separation. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the establishment level. See Figure 4 for a def-
inition of “All layoffs” and “All quits”. “Dismissals only” are defined as cause 2 and
“Resignations only” are defined as cause 1 in Table A1.
γs−0.05 γ
s
−0.1 γ
s
−0.15 γ
s
−0.2 γ
s
−0.3 γ
s
−0.4 N R
2
(1) All separations −0.793 −0.884 −0.900 −0.931 −0.947 −0.954 212,673 0.719
(Quits + layoffs) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.024)
(2) All layoffs −0.352 −0.429 −0.434 −0.462 −0.456 −0.586 212,673 0.402
(0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.038)
(3) All quits −0.446 −0.454 −0.464 −0.467 −0.491 −0.362 212,673 0.304
(0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.032)
(4) Dismissals only −0.192 −0.278 −0.310 −0.340 −0.351 −0.488 212,673 0.362
(0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.038)
(5) Resignations only −0.271 −0.246 −0.251 −0.264 −0.267 −0.152 212,673 0.114
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.023)
In rows (2) and (3) we split total separations into those classified as quits
and layoffs. As was clear from Figure 4, there is an increase in both quits and
layoffs. For small falls in employment (0 > ∆n ≥ −0.05) slightly more than half
of all separations are classified as quits. For larger employment reductions the
contribution of layoffs increases, although it is striking that quits still contribute
one-third of the total employment reduction for −0.3 > ∆n ≥ −0.4.
To some extent our classification of separations into quits and layoffs is arbi-
trary.9 For example, cause 5 (“termination by mutual agreement” – see Appendix
A) might in fact be better thought of as a layoff. To be clear about what is driv-
ing the result in Table 4, in rows (4) and (5) of we also report the relationship
between job flows and those separations defined as “Dismissal on the part of the
employer” and “Resignations on the part of the employee”. Here we see a larger
difference in the response between the two types of separation. But, even when
quits are more narrowly defined, they still account for about one-quarter of the
employment reduction for small falls in employment and about one-sixth for larger
falls in employment. Narrowly-defined layoffs only account for one-fifth of small
falls in employment, but nearly half of large falls in employment.
Table 4 thus shows that part of the explanation for the fact that separations
increase rapidly with employment falls is that the quit rate also increases rapidly.
9McLaughlin (1991) argues that there is no meaningful distinction.
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(Recall that in the basic theoretical framework q¯ was constant.) German estab-
lishments can reduce employment via separations because a substantial fraction of
those separations are classified as “voluntary”. Thus, employment reductions are
managed by workers choosing to leave shrinking establishments because shrinking
establishments offer worse opportunities.10 Thus quits, or voluntary redundancies,
an important margin which firms can use to meet reduced labour demand.
6.2 Churning and the attrition channel
The explained in Section 2, the extent to which firms can use attrition to reduce
employment depends on how much worker churning there is. The higher is the
quit rate at ∆n = 0, the greater the scope for reducing employment without
making layoffs. To illustrate the importance of churning in allowing for attrition,
we estimate ∆hg from (6) separately for establishments grouped according to their
churning rate. For each establishment we compute the churning rate for the three
previous years and separate into low (below the median), medium (median to 75th
percentile) and high (above 75th percentile) churning establishments. Results are
reported in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Proportion of employment reduction account for by falls in
hiring, establishment survey. Churning is calculated as the average of
h+ s− (∆n) for periods t− 1, t− 2 and t− 3, so the first three periods
of data are lost for each establishment.
We find that δhg is higher for establishments with higher churning. However,
even for high churning establishments we do not observe anywhere near the rates
10Davis et al. (2012) call this the “abandon-ship” effect; the model of Faberman (2008) predicts
that workers at less successful firms are more likely to quit.
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of hiring reduction predicted by a model in which establishments use the attrition
channel wherever possible. It is clear that, even for high-churn establishments,
separations are an essential part of employment reduction.
6.3 Job and worker heterogeneity
The prediction that establishments should rely on the attrition channel relies on
the assumption that jobs and workers within the establishment are homogeneous.
In this case, workers who quit can be used to achieve the new level of employment.
However, if the establishment comprises many different jobs, workers whose jobs
are destroyed cannot be re-allocated to the positions of those workers who quit.11
Thus, even when an establishment is shrinking it must still make replacement hires
because these jobs are still required.
The social security data allows us to test this by examining the pattern of
hires and separations within narrowly defined occupations within the establish-
ment. The social security data contains 369 three-digit occupation codes.12 Mean
establishment employment is 147, while mean employment within an occupation
within an establishment is just 11. It seems plausible therefore that jobs and work-
ers within occupations are much more homogeneous than within establishments.
We create a panel of occupations within establishments, and calculate the same
decomposition i.e. ∆Nijt = Hijt − Sijt, where i indexes establishment as before
and j indexes occupation.
As noted in Section 2, churning may be driven by workers joining and leaving
a given set of jobs, or by changes in the composition of jobs. For example, an
establishment may destroy a job in occupation a and create a job in occupation
b. Our occupation-establishment level panel allows us to calculate the extent to
which churning is driven by the former or the latter. In Figure 6 we plot the
coefficients from a fixed-effects regression of the churning rate on the employment
growth rate.
Figure 6 shows that churning is indeed much lower at the occupation-estab-
lishment level. At zero employment growth, more than 40% of the establishment-
level churning is the result of changes in occupational composition within the
establishment. If workers cannot easily be reallocated across occupations (as we
have shown) then this provides an explanation for the continued hiring behaviour
11Albæk and Sørensen (1998) make exactly this point: “. . . most workers are specialised and
not easily reshuﬄed from vanishing jobs to jobs of otherwise separating workers”, although they
do not provide direct evidence of this.
12The occupational classification used is the Klassifizierung der Berufe, Ausgabe 1992 (KldB
92).
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Figure 6: Churning at the occupation level and the establishment level as a function of
employment growth, computed from the point-in-time social security data (BS). Churn-
ing is defined as hijt + sijt − |∆nijt at the occupation level and hit + sit − |∆nit at the
establishment level. Vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals based on standard
errors clustered at the establishment level.
of shrinking establishments, and the fact that there is such a strong separation
response. Essentially, an establishment which wishes to reduce employment in one
occupation cannot use attrition from another occupation to achieve that reduction.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we use survey and administrative data to examine the relationship
between employment growth and worker flows at the establishment level. This
relationship is potentially a key explanation for differences in unemployment re-
sponses to aggregate shocks.
Our first finding confirms the received wisdom that hires and separations are
lower in Germany than in the US. This finding is not the result of using recall data
from a survey, since we get very similar estimates from administrative data. Our
second finding is more surprising. The relationship between employment growth,
hires and separations is very similar to that found in the US. Establishments
which grow increase hirings almost one-for-one with increased employment, and
establishments which shrink increase separations immediately with reduced em-
ployment. Even small falls in employment are associated with significant increases
in separations, and the separation margin is more important than the hiring mar-
gin in almost every case we examine. This result is robust across survey and
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administrative data and across different types of establishment.
Why do German establishments need to make use of increased separations
when they reduce employment? We propose three explanations. First, a large
fraction of separations, particularly for small employment reductions, are classi-
fied as voluntary by establishments. Quits account for the majority of separations
for employment reductions of up to 30%. Second, the level of churning in Ger-
man establishments is low, and so the scope for reduced hiring is limited. Third,
the heterogeneity of jobs within establishments prevent “reshuﬄing” of existing
workers into those positions which are made vacant by attrition.
Our results are consistent with the finding (e.g. Bassanini, 2010) that both
job and worker flows differ substantially across countries, and that job flows are
strong predictors of worker flows. If the adjustment function is quite stable across
countries, then the number of hires and separations will be driven largely by em-
ployment adjustments at the firm level.
However, despite the fact that we find a strong relationship between separa-
tions and employment reductions, our findings are not inconsistent with the view
that recessions in Europe are characterised by an acyclicality in unemployment
inflows compared to the US. The cyclicality of unemployment inflows (or layoffs)
also depends on the position and movement of the cross-sectional distribution of
employment growth Davis et al. (2006). If the mass of the employment growth
distribution remains positive, weak business cycles can still cause large fluctua-
tions in hiring rates but not in separation rates, because it is the hiring rate which
matters in this part of the distribution.
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Appendix A Questions used in the IAB estab-
lishment panel on worker turnover
The following questions are used to determine hires and separations:
1. Did you recruit staff in the first half of <current year>?
2. Please indicate the total number of workers recruited.
3. Did you register any staff leaving your establishment/office in the first half
of <current year>?
4. Please indicate the total number of workers who left your establishment.
Respondents are also asked to distribute the total number of employees who
left among 10 different categories, shown in Table A1.
Table A1: Six-month separation rate by type of separation. Table shows the mean
separation rate across all establishments and all years, s¯, the fraction of establishment-
years with positive separations, Pr(sit > 0), and the average separation rate for those
establishment-years with any separations of that type, s¯ | sit > 0. Weighted by sampling
weights and employment.
s¯ Pr(sit > 0) (s¯ | sit > 0)
All separations 5.28 48.89 8.52
1. Resignation on the part of the employee 1.92 28.47 4.54
2. Dismissal on the part of the employer 1.52 22.54 4.90
3. Leaving after termination of the in-company training 0.20 6.24 1.93
4. Expiration of a temporary employment contract 0.50 11.51 2.63
5. Termination of a contract by mutual agreement 0.37 8.80 2.38
6. Transfer to another establishment within the organization 0.12 3.23 1.72
7. Retirement after reaching the stipulated pension age 0.28 11.42 1.37
8. Retirement before reaching the stipulated pensionable age 0.06 3.65 1.01
9. Occupational invalidity/ disability 0.02 1.55 0.66
10. Other 0.26 4.64 3.34
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Appendix B Basic sample characteristics
Table B1: The number of establishments, average size and other key character-
istics changes over the sample period, mainly due to the inclusion of additional
establishments in the sample. Establishments in East Germany joined the sample
in 1996.
Total no.
of estab-
lishments
West
Germany
East
Germanya
Average
emp-
loyment
Hiresb Separationsb
Av. no. % Av. no. %
1993 2,908 2,839 69 519 10 4.8 30 6.2
1994 2,996 2,920 76 448 13 5.1 23 12.0
1995 3,055 2,982 73 414 16 5.7 19 7.4
1996 5,785 2,935 2,850 253 8 5.9 14 8.6
1997 6,270 2,895 3,375 211 7 6.3 11 9.0
1998 6,572 2,939 3,633 197 9 6.1 8 7.9
1999 6,982 2,953 4,029 175 8 6.5 10 9.9
2000 10,402 6,094 4,308 138 7 6.1 7 7.6
2001 11,584 7,048 4,536 132 7 6.2 7 8.4
2002 11,394 7,193 4,201 126 5 5.5 6 13.1
2003 11,973 7,347 4,626 114 4 5.3 6 8.3
2004 11,839 7,321 4,518 126 4 5.2 5 7.5
2005 11,998 7,375 4,623 125 4 4.9 5 7.6
2006 11,732 7,169 4,563 116 5 5.7 5 6.9
2007 12,085 7,451 4,634 109 5 5.8 4 6.1
2008 11,986 7,250 4,736 106 6 5.7 5 6.5
2009 12,095 7,390 4,705 101 3 5.0 5 8.4
2010 12,293 7,512 4,781 93 4 5.3 4 6.8
2011 12,081 7,391 4,690 94 5 6.1 4 6.0
2012 12,133 7,407 4,726 93 5 6.0 5 6.6
2013 12,285 7,432 4,853 87 5 5.7 4 6.4
2014 12,229 7,347 4,882 83 5 6.2 4 6.7
a Includes West Berlin.
b Hires and separations for the first six months of the calendar year.
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Figure B1: Distribution of six-monthly employment growth in German establishments,
1993–2014, weighted by establishment employment.
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Appendix C Calculating worker flows from the
social security data
The worker-level social security data can be used to identify when individuals join
and leave establishments. However, the precise measure of hires and separations
is affected by (a) the choice of which workers to include and (b) the treatment of
gaps in individuals’ social security records.
Until 1999 the social security data contained information (predominantly) on
permanent workers subject to social security. From 1999 onwards the data include
records for other more marginal types of worker. Figure C1 shows that the hiring
and separation rate is about 3.5 percentage points higher if we include all workers
in the calculation as opposed to just permanent workers covered by social security.
Figure C1 additionally shows that gaps in individuals’ social security record also
increase the measure of hires and separations. A “gap” occurs if an individual
works for establishment j in period t and at j in period t + k(k > 1) without an
intervening spell of employment. If temporary layoffs are an important feature of
the data, the inclusion of these gaps could make a difference. Including these gaps
increases the measured hiring and separation rate by about 2.7 percentage points.
In order to achieve a consistent series over the whole time period our measure
of worker flows reported in the paper is based only on permanent workers covered
by the social security system, and does not count a gap as a separation and hire.
Note that none of these decisions changes our key conclusion as to the relationship
between worker flows and job flows.
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Figure C1: Annual employment growth, hires and separation calculated from social se-
curity statistics. “Type 101” indicates that the sample includes only permanent workers
subject to social security. “Gaps” indicate that workers who temporarily leave and rejoin
the same establishment because of a gap in their social security record are included as
hires and separations. “99-07” indicates that the data cover the period 1999–2007 only.
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